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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In disputed presidential and other elections, what is the appropri-
ate relationship between state law and state institutions versus na-
tional law and national institutions? What does the constitutional 
law of elections, prior to the 2000 presidential election, tell us about 
how that relationship has long been legally understood? This broader 
jurisprudence of elections offers a more general, external stance from 
which disputes over this relationship surrounding Bush v. Gore can 
be helpfully assessed.  
 Two alternative starting points for defining the national/state le-
gal relationship over elections can readily be identified. One view 
would emphasize the importance of the autonomy of state election 
law from federal control, whether the election is for state or federal 
office. If this view seems surprising when it comes to federal elec-
tions—particularly when it comes to elections for the highest na-
tional office in the land—it is a surprise that can nonetheless be 
rooted in the text of the U.S. Constitution itself. Article II allocates to 
the states the power to enact presidential-elector legislation in the 
first place. From there it is hardly a large structural leap to infer 
that state institutions ought to have the central (perhaps, exclusive) 
role in implementing this legislation. That power would, on this view, 
necessarily include the lesser power to resolve disputes over the 
meaning of such legislation through ordinary state-law processes. 
Indeed, the exclusivity or autonomy of state dispute-resolution law 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.   
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might arguably be itself constitutionally enshrined: the very Article 
II commitment to state control over presidential-elector selection 
might be viewed as uniquely insulating the states from national con-
trol in this context. Thus, whether it is the U.S. Congress or the U.S. 
Supreme Court that would seek to override state law and state in-
terpretation of state law, Article II might be thought to preclude such 
exercises of national power. That result might be considered a 
quirky, even dysfunctional remnant of the original constitutional 
structure; after all, why should states and state law play such a 
dominant role in resolving disputes over presidential elections, given 
the transparent national interests at stake? Yet such a result would 
be no odder than the Electoral College itself. And just as we must ag-
gregate votes through that institution absent constitutional change, 
we might similarly be bound through Article II to acknowledge the 
exclusive role of state interpretation of state law in the presidential 
election context.  
 But more than text, originalism, and constitutional structure 
might be offered to defend this first view. Contemporary functional 
justifications can also be marshaled to support state-law autonomy 
even in federal elections; indeed, these functional justifications would 
track the values associated more generally with the decentralized 
election structure that has long characterized elections in the United 
States, even for national office. As James Gardner puts it in his con-
tribution to this symposium, we could imagine that electoral decen-
tralization, including the radical decentralization involved with leav-
ing individual counties even such choices as how to design ballots, is 
a structural means of hindering a single set of partisan forces from 
gaining unified control over drafting and administering election 
rules.1 Even seemingly technical and arcane election rules, we know, 
can affect electoral outcomes—particularly when we focus on the cu-
mulative effect of unified control over numerous such rules. On this 
view, then, what looks like a chaos of local rules, practices, stan-
dards, and structures for resolving national elections becomes a ra-
tional, “realist-”inspired means of deploying dramatic decentraliza-
tion to avoid partisan capture of elections. This functional view 
would apply just as much to national elections as to any other. The 
first federal judge to address the merits of the Bush campaign’s fed-
eral constitutional claims, Judge Middlebrooks, took essentially this 
view: 
Rather than a sign of weakness or constitutional injury, some sol-
ace [concerning Florida’s highly decentralized electoral system] 
can be taken in the fact that no one centralized body or person can 
                                                                                                                    
 1. James A. Gardner, The Regulatory Role of State Constitutional Structural Con-
straints in Presidential Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 651-58 (2001).   
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control the tabulation of an entire statewide or national election. 
For the more county boards and individuals involved in the elec-
toral regulation process, the less likely it becomes that corruption, 
bias, or error can influence the ultimate result of an election.2  
Corruption can counteract corruption, perhaps, where election regu-
lation and administration is radically decentralized. 
 The alternative starting point would begin by emphasizing the 
constitutional status of the right to vote and the values associated 
with that right’s constitutional—hence, national—position. Since 
the 1960s, the right to vote, even for state and local offices, has 
been recognized to implicate constitutional values of political equal-
ity. To constitutionalize the right to vote is, by definition, to nation-
alize its entailments and safeguards; it is to recognize a constitu-
tional, hence national, interest in uniform, consistent treatment of 
certain aspects of voting and political representation. Indeed, con-
stitutional doctrine has been concerned since the 1960s about en-
suring protection of the interests secured through “the right to vote” 
even in state, local, and yet more narrowly confined elections;3 
surely the force of this constitutional right will be not just equally 
powerful but at its strongest when it comes to national elections—
particularly elections for the Presidency. Indeed, before Bush v. 
Gore, Supreme Court decisions already had recognized distinct na-
tional and constitutional interests associated with presidential elec-
tions.4 In other words, constitutionalization of the right to vote (and 
political rights closely associated with the right to vote), along with 
judicial recognition of unique constitutional interests associated 
with presidential elections, reflects a fundamental resistance to un-
qualified endorsement of state autonomy and radical decentraliza-
tion of the voting process—particularly for national elections. More-
                                                                                                                    
 2. Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1052 (S.D. Fla. 2000), aff’d, 234 F.3d 1163 
(11th Cir. 2000). 
 3. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (applying one-vote, one-
person to elections for trustees of local junior college district authority); Kramer v. Union 
Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (extending the right to vote to local elections); 
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (holding that one-vote, one-person doctrine 
applies to elections for local commissioners courts in Texas). In recent years, the Court has 
qualified the application of one-vote, one-person to certain special purpose local elections. 
See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (rejecting application of one-vote, one-person to 
“narrow, special” purpose electoral bodies). 
 4. Thus, in ballot-access cases, the Court first struck down restrictive laws in the 
context of presidential elections. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (sustaining 
ballot-access challenge by third-party presidential candidate). Similarly, the Court has lim-
ited the power states otherwise have over primary election structures when the states seek 
to extend those powers into direct control of national political party conventions. See De-
mocratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (holding unconstitutional state law that 
required state-chosen presidential delegates to vote in accord with results of state’s open-
primary process, despite National Democratic Party rule requiring that only Party mem-
bers be able to participate in selection of National Democratic Party’s nominee). 
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over, to the extent the “autonomy of state law” view rests on his-
torical pedigree, the entire development of the modern right to vote 
jurisprudence rests on a rejection of this history’s authority for con-
temporary constitutional law. 
 Undeniable tension thus exists between the role of state and na-
tional law in the electoral process. The question is how that tension, 
then, is best resolved. More particularly, the specific issue is what 
role, if any, federal courts should play in determining whether state 
courts, when they interpret state election statutes, have inappropri-
ately made “new law”—in presidential or other elections. The contri-
butions to this symposium of both Robert Schapiro and James Gard-
ner, two leading authorities on state constitutionalism, press for con-
siderable autonomy of state election law.5 On their view, aspects of 
Bush v. Gore reflect an inappropriate “centralization of power in the 
national government.”6 This centralizing tendency is most dramati-
cally displayed in the concurring opinion’s dismissal of the Florida 
Supreme Court’s reading of state law; that concurrence comes close 
to treating the meaning of state presidential-elector laws as itself di-
rectly a question of federal law. From the perspective of state consti-
tutionalism, Schapiro and Gardner criticize the dramatic intrusion 
into state judicial processes that the concurrence represents.  
 There is force in this plea for the independence of state law. But 
from the perspective of election law, state election-law decisions can-
not be wholly free from constitutional oversight; a view that would 
make state law completely autonomous would give too little weight, 
in my view, to a legitimate constitutional interest in ensuring the in-
tegrity of electoral processes. I want to map out a different course for 
engaging the tension between state and national institutions; I will 
situate Bush v. Gore in the less overwhelming context of more rou-
tine electoral disputes and the approach lower federal courts have 
taken to those disputes. What emerges from this body of law is, on 
the one hand, an acknowledgment of national constitutional interests 
in overseeing election disputes and state judicial interpretations of 
state election laws. Indeed, this approach is more aggressively “cen-
                                                                                                                    
 5. Gardner, supra note 1, at 627; Robert A. Schapiro, Conceptions and Misconcep-
tions of State Constitutional Law in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 661, 678 (2001).    
 6. Gardner, supra note 1, at 658. Both papers come from leading authorities on state 
constitutionalism, a field that has been identified as worthy of its own study but under-
studied until recently; Bush v. Gore perhaps will catalyze greater attention to the role of 
state constitutions. For other studies of state constitutionalism and the distinct structure 
and function of state courts and state constitutions, see Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and 
the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001), 
and Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Ra-
tionality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 131 (1999). On state constitutional law theory, see also 
Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271 
(1998). 
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tralizing” than even the concurrence in Bush v. Gore, for that concur-
rence would limit federal oversight to the context of presidential elec-
tions. In contrast, the approach I identify here finds national consti-
tutional interests implicated even in state and local elections. Yet at 
the same time, the approach I identify here is more rule-bound and 
circumscribed than that in Bush v. Gore itself. Indeed, by showing 
how even the federal courts most committed to aggressive federal 
oversight of election disputes have justified and confined their over-
sight, the singularity of Bush v. Gore—in its view of the relationship 
between federal and state law—becomes even more apparent. 
II.   THE ISSUE DEFINED: CHANGING ELECTION RULES IN THE MIDST 
OF ELECTION CONTROVERSIES 
 Throughout the election litigation, a principal concern on all 
sides—and certainly of the United States Supreme Court—was 
whether various actors were changing prior Florida law or practice 
as specific issues arose: whether to permit a recount at all, for how 
long, under what standards, and the like. Although the per curiam’s 
resolution did not formally turn on a conclusion that the Florida Su-
preme Court had improperly changed state law, it is undeniable that 
such a concern was a driving force in the Supreme Court majority’s 
response to the entire litigation. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring 
opinion in Bush v. Gore, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, does, 
of course, come down strongly for the view that the Florida Supreme 
Court had indeed changed state law in the guise of interpreting it.7 
Indeed, so strongly did these three Justices hold this view that they 
excoriated the Florida Supreme Court in the most contemptuous 
terms: the Florida court’s readings were “absurd,” ones “[n]o reason-
able person” would endorse, and “plainly departed from the legisla-
tive scheme.”8 Prominent academic defenders of the Court, such as 
Richard Posner and Richard Epstein, have also argued that this 
view—that the Florida courts had changed state law—provides the 
most convincing legal justification for the result in Bush v. Gore.9  
 Cast in general terms, Judge Posner’s animating principle is one 
with which all of us can no doubt agree: “Nothing is more infuriating 
than changing the election rules after the outcome of the election, 
                                                                                                                    
 7. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 117-20 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 8. Id. at 118-19.   
 9. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Di-
rect”: The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE & THE SUPREME 
COURT 13, 21, 35-37 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); Electronic Dia-
logue between Judge Richard A. Posner and Professor Alan M. Dershowitz, The Supreme 
Court and the 2000 Election, SLATE, July 2-9, 2001, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=111313 
(“The problem at hand is a state court’s intervening to change the result of an election of 
the state’s presidential electors by changing the ground rules under which the election was 
held.”) (Monday, July 9).  
696  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:691 
 
conducted under the existing rules, is known.”10 Both the concurrence 
and these commentators locate the constitutional bar against such 
changes in Article II, Section 1.11 This concern about changes in state 
law also looms over the per curiam’s alternative equal protection 
analysis. The Florida Supreme Court recount order permitted incon-
sistent treatment between counties regarding what would constitute 
an actual vote. This was one of the equal protection violations the 
United States Supreme Court found. In addition, the per curiam 
found constitutional defects in “the actual process” in which the 
manual recount would be undertaken. The Florida courts  
did not specify who would recount the ballots. The county canvass-
ing boards were forced to pull together ad hoc teams of judges from 
various Circuits who had no previous training in handling and in-
terpreting ballots. Furthermore, while others were permitted to 
observe, they were prohibited from objecting during the recount.12 
These concerns might doctrinally be best located in the Due Process 
Clause, though the per curiam folded them into its equal protection 
analysis. But regardless of the doctrinal cubbyhole, the underlying 
concern here too is that the recount process would not provide 
enough security against the potential manipulation of state law and 
practice; in other words, the prospective possibility that rules would 
be changed in the middle of the game also formed one grounding for 
the per curiam opinion.  
Finally, questions at the oral arguments revealed how 
tempted certain Justices were to the view that the Florida Supreme 
Court had changed state law, even if these Justices ultimately did 
not make that view the announced basis for their decision. Justice 
O’Connor, for example, twice referred to the “special deference” she 
thought state courts might owe state legislatures when interpreting 
election statutes in a presidential election, “so as to avoid having the 
law changed after the election.”13 Justice Kennedy similarly asked 
whether “the Florida legislature [could] have done what the [Florida] 
supreme court did” and suggested the answer was no, “because that 
would be a new law . . . .”14 
                                                                                                                    
 10. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 159 (2001). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. This now-famous provision provides that states shall 
choose presidential electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct . . . .” 
 12. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. 
 13. Tr. of Oral Arguments at 7, 43-44, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) 
(Dec. 11, 2000), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/00-949.pdf. (An unofficial transcript of the oral arguments in Bush v. Gore re-
vealing the remarks of each individual Justice is available at http://www.npr.org/ 
news/national/election2000/specials/supremecourt/001211.court.html). 
 14. Id. at 39-41. 
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 The concern about “new state law” being made in the context of 
election litigation thus played a dominant role in the Supreme 
Court’s response to and resolution of the 2000 election. This concern 
about changes in state law and practice is both predictable and per-
vasive in election disputes. Predictable, because in closely disputed 
races, each side will accuse those who rule against it of having inten-
tionally changed the rules in order to produce that result—and the 
losing side will likely believe its own accusations sincerely. Perva-
sive, because unless the rules or established state practices are pre-
cise and comprehensive in advance, it is likely that gaps will emerge 
in the application of those laws to the specifics of any particular elec-
tion dispute. When these gaps must be resolved in the context of a 
pending dispute, rather than ex ante, courts or administrative offi-
cials—and those who observe them—will know (or believe they know) 
the likely effect on the outcome of closing the legal gap in one way 
rather than another. Courts cannot blind themselves to the likely 
outcome-influencing effects of their legal rulings; hence the fear that 
courts will be motivated by knowledge of those effects will be present 
whenever clear consensus on litigated issues is absent—as it often 
will be. For strong believers in decentralized decisionmaking over 
electoral issues, even in national contests, this concern will not be 
enough to justify recognition of a countervailing federal constitu-
tional interest that would guard against the creation of “new law.” 
But well before Bush v. Gore, a number of federal courts had recog-
nized exactly such a constitutional interest. Grounding the analysis 
in this previously established “law of new law” provides a way of 
stepping outside the highly charged context of Bush v. Gore to gain a 
more general perspective. 
III.   THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST IN AVOIDING “NEW LAW” 
IN STATE AS WELL AS FEDERAL ELECTION DISPUTES 
 Broadly cast, the question is this: What substantive reasons, if 
any, should be sufficient to justify constitutional oversight of election 
disputes, be they state or federal? What exactly are the federal con-
stitutional interests (or, statutory interests, if relevant) in various 
aspects of the election process, including in potential disputes that 
arise after the election? To what extent does or should the federal in-
terest vary when state offices rather than national offices are at 
stake, or when different national offices, with different electoral 
processes—such as the House, the Senate, or the Presidency—are in-
volved? 
 The framework within which this issue is to be considered must 
begin with a recognition of this central problem: every dispute about 
election processes implicates, by definition, questions involving vot-
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ing and democratic processes. In a colloquial sense, then, every dis-
pute about elections could be said to implicate “the right to vote.” 
This is true for state elections as well as federal elections. But if 
every dispute implicated “the right to vote” in a constitutional 
sense—under the Fourteenth Amendment, for example—then every 
issue concerning disputed elections, state or federal, would be trans-
formed into a federal constitutional issue. Federal constitutional law 
would then be turned into a detailed election code for both state and 
federal elections. This would hardly be unprecedented in democratic 
countries. In France, for example, the Constitutional Council (com-
parable to the U.S. Supreme Court) sits as the election overseer for 
all parliamentary elections and has broad administrative powers 
over the conduct of local elections—including the resolution of elec-
tion disputes.15 
 American legal and political practice, however, has been quite dif-
ferent. Just as the United States Supreme Court has resisted consti-
tutionalizing the vast body of state tort law and has refused to per-
mit the ordinary deprivation of state-law property interests to be 
transformed into Fourteenth Amendment issues where state proce-
dures are adequate,16 the federal courts have similarly declined to 
transform most issues involving the conduct and resolution of elec-
tions into federal constitutional matters. The unique legal architec-
ture of American democracy—a product of the oldest constitutional 
design in the world and subsequent legal additions built upon that 
original structure—represents a complex interlacing of federal and 
state interests in matters of voting, elections, and political participa-
tion. Many of the issues involving electoral structures are left to be 
resolved at the state level, even when national offices are at stake. 
The original Constitution, for example, only specifies voter eligibility 
requirements for one national office, the House of Representatives.17 
Even here, the federal requirements were designed to be wholly de-
rivative of state-law suffrage requirements. For example, Article I, 
Section 2 states that electors for the House of Representatives “shall 
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous 
Branch of the State Legislature.”18 Defining the boundary line, then, 
between issues left to be resolved as a matter of state law and issues 
that instead implicate distinct federal constitutional interests re-
                                                                                                                    
 15. Noëlle Lenoir, Constitutional Council Review of Presidential Elections in France 
and a French Judicial Perspective on Bush v. Gore, in THE LONGEST NIGHT: PERSPECTIVES 
AND POLEMICS ON ELECTION 2000 (Arthur Jacobson & Michel Rosenfeld eds., forthcoming 
2001-02) (manuscript at 6-7, on file with the Florida State University Law Review). 
 16. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
 17. This structure was modified in 1913 by the Seventeenth Amendment, which man-
dates direct election for senators. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. 
amend. XVII, § 1.   
 18. Id.  art. I, § 2, cl. 1.   
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quires working out the intricate relationship between federal and 
state law that has long structured the American democratic system—
even for national offices. 
 On the one hand, the courts have recognized several discrete and 
specific constitutional interests in the structuring of elections. The 
courts recognized most of these interests only beginning in the 1960s, 
after Baker v. Carr19 effectively overturned Giles v. Harris20 and en-
dorsed the justiciability of claims involving “political rights.” Thus, 
state election districts must comply with the one-vote, one-person 
principle. The Constitution also imposes constraints on partisan and 
racial design of all election districts.21 In addition, since Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Elections,22 the Court has also held that definitions 
of who can participate in what elections, on what terms, are subject 
to equal protection and due process review. Similarly, the Constitu-
tion imposes constraints on the conditions states can impose upon 
candidates seeking to be listed on the ballot.23 So, too, the Constitu-
tion’s First Amendment recognizes associational rights that protect 
the integrity and autonomy of political parties from certain types of 
state regulation.24 State election laws that discriminate on their face 
along racial lines have been unconstitutional since the line of cases 
that banned “the white primary,”25 and of course election laws that 
reflect an impermissible racial or ethnic purpose are unconstitutional 
under either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.26 Finally, the 
most important federal statute that overlays state elections, the Vot-
ing Rights Act,27 prohibits electoral structures and practices whose 
purpose or effect is to dilute the voting power of certain statutorily 
protected groups.28 These provide most of the specific, targeted fed-
eral interests in election processes, both state and federal. 
 On the other hand, if there were a more generalized constitutional 
interest in ensuring “the integrity of the electoral process” or in se-
curing “fundamental fairness” in elections, then every dispute over 
                                                                                                                    
 19. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 20. 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (holding that claims of “political rights” were not justiciable). 
For the history of Giles and its influence on subsequent constitutional law, see Richard H. 
Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2000). 
 21. On partisan constraints, see Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); on racial 
constraints, see Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 22. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 23. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (sustaining ballot access challenge by 
third-party presidential candidate). 
 24. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572-74 (2000). 
 25. These cases start with Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), and end nearly 
thirty years later with Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
 26. The most recent application of this principle, in the Fifteenth Amendment con-
text, is Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994). 
 28. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
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the running of elections would indeed be subject to potential federal 
oversight and control. To avoid this prospect, federal courts have 
sought to delineate the distinction between specific, well-defined fed-
eral interests in the conduct of elections and the array of other issues 
that might be disputed; the latter election-related issues have long 
been treated as best resolved through the ordinary processes of state 
law. Thus, disputes about whether vote counts were in error due to 
technological defects are not recognized as implicating federal inter-
ests. As the Fifth Circuit acknowledged in an oft-cited case, the fail-
ure to count votes adequately, stated abstractly, could easily sound 
like a constitutional issue. 29 But the way the American legal struc-
ture conventionally gives content to this abstract right requires at-
tending to the functional structure embodied in the Constitution, the 
nature of the federal court system, the limits of federal jurisdiction, 
and the role of states in election processes. As the late Judge Rubin 
put it, in writing for the Fifth Circuit, federal law must 
recognize a distinction between state laws and patterns of state ac-
tion that systematically deny equality in voting, and episodic 
events that, despite non-discriminatory laws, may result in the di-
lution of an individual’s vote. Unlike systematically discriminatory 
laws, isolated events that adversely affect individuals are not pre-
sumed to be a violation of the equal protection clause. The unlaw-
ful administration by state officers of a non-discriminatory state 
law, “resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled 
to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there 
is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful 
discrimination.” 
 . . . If every state election irregularity were considered a federal 
constitutional deprivation, federal courts would adjudicate every 
state election dispute, and the elaborate state election contest pro-
cedures, designed to assure speedy and orderly disposition of the 
multitudinous questions that may arise in the electoral process, 
would be superseded by a section 1983 gloss. . . . [Constitutional 
law does] not authorize federal courts to be state election moni-
tors.30 
 This is typical of the bulk of federal court opinions. For similar 
reasons, federal courts have also held that the mere violation of a 
state statute by an election official is not a constitutional violation; 
nor are errors and irregularities that can be expected of the electoral 
process; nor is improper counting of ballots absent aggravating fac-
tors such as fraud or racial discrimination.31 
                                                                                                                    
 29. Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 30. Id. at 453-54 (citations omitted). 
 31. Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 1975). The Court stated that  
the work of conducting elections in our society is typically carried on by volun-
teers and recruits for whom it is at most an avocation and whose experience 
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 Yet at the same time that courts have resisted constitutionalizing 
most aspects of disputed elections, some federal courts have recog-
nized at least one kind of relevant federal interest: an interest in 
providing security against state courts or other state actors develop-
ing “new law” in the context of resolving election disputes. Changes 
in state law or practice, whether through judicial or administrative 
action, can reach the point of what these federal courts have called 
“patent and fundamental unfairness,”32 enough so that federal consti-
tutional violations arise. Those federal courts that have identified 
such an interest, before Bush v. Gore, have done so even when the 
election at issue was for state or local office. Thus, these cases have 
identified a general constitutional interest, not confined to presiden-
tial elections, in the avoidance of “new law.” But these courts have 
also cautioned that for a constitutional violation of this sort to arise, 
the “situation must go well beyond the ordinary dispute over the 
counting and marking of ballots.”33  
 These cases, therefore, provide a partial rejection, even before 
Bush v. Gore, of the position that no federal interest is implicated in 
the way state courts interpret their own state election laws—and this 
interest is strong enough to apply even when the underlying election 
itself is for state office. These cases thus constitute the outer edge of 
a new frontier in the application of constitutional law to election dis-
putes. At the same time, the way these courts have approached the 
freighted question of when “new law” has in fact been created reveals 
an adjudicatory practice that has developed relatively precise criteria 
for identifying “new election law.” How the approach of the United 
States Supreme Court compares to this approach from the few fed-
eral courts previously willing to act in this area is the topic to which I 
now turn. 
                                                                                                                    
and intelligence vary widely. Given these conditions, errors and irregularities, 
including the kind of conduct proved here, are inevitable, and no constitutional 
guarantee exists to remedy them. Rather, state election laws must be relied 
upon to provide the proper remedy.  
Id. (citations omitted); see also Welch v. McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding 
that despite numerous violations of state election laws, no federal constitutional violation 
occurred in absence of racially discriminatory intent behind those violations or racial vote 
dilution occurring); Pettengill v. Putnam Co. R-1 Sch. Dist., 472 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 
1973) (concluding that federal courts should not become the “arbiter of disputes” which 
arise in elections and attempt to “oversee the administrative details of a local election” ab-
sent aggravating factors such as denial of the vote on grounds of race or fraudulent inter-
ference with a free election by stuffing of the ballot box and holding that there was no fed-
eral violation in alleged improper counting of ballots). 
 32. Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Roe I] (quoting 
Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 703 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)).  
 33. Id. 
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IV.   IDENTIFYING “NEW LAW”34 
 The most intriguing finding of an unconstitutional change in state 
election law arose out of disputed statewide elections in Alabama in 
1994 for the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court and the 
State Treasurer. Initially, vote tallies showed an extremely close 
race, particularly for Chief Justice, where 200 to 300 votes appeared 
to be the margin of victory.35 The Roe litigation, a massive and 
lengthy dispute that intertwined the federal and state courts over 
many years, arose over 1,000 to 2,000 contested absentee ballots not 
counted in the initial returns.36 The critical state-law question was 
whether those ballots were illegal and not to be counted because they 
were improperly notarized or witnessed. And the further question, 
which eventually triggered a federal constitutional decision in the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, was whether the answer 
the Alabama state courts gave to that question—whether these ab-
sentee ballots should be counted—was itself an answer that was con-
sistent with prior state law and practice on absentee ballots. If not—
if the Alabama courts had changed a clearly established rule of state 
law or well-established state practices—did the decision of the state 
judicial system then amount to a federal constitutional violation? 
What is the federal interest in ensuring consistency and regularity in 
state elections, and if such an interest exists, what must be proven to 
establish a violation of that interest? 
 The minuet between state and federal judicial acts in the Roe liti-
gation reveals a lot about the relationship between federal and state 
courts also at issue in Bush v. Gore. First, after the results of the dis-
puted election became known, some absentee voters sought an order 
from the state circuit court requiring the contested absentee ballots 
to be counted.37 That court issued a temporary restraining order that 
forced the Secretary of State to wait until the county canvassing offi-
cials had included the contested absentee ballots in the vote totals 
before certifying the election.38 Second, in response to this decision, 
other voters and two candidates sought an injunction in federal dis-
trict court ordering state officials to disregard the state circuit court’s 
order.39 The federal district court found that the state court order 
constituted a change in Alabama’s past practice for dealing with ab-
                                                                                                                    
 34. Portions of Part IV, describing the procedural posture of the Roe and Griffin cases, 
are derived from SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, WHEN 
ELECTIONS GO BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at 
10-19 (rev. ed. 2001).    
 35. Roe I, 43 F.3d at 578.  
 36. The key substantive ruling of this litigation is found in Roe I. 
 37. Roe I, 43 F.3d at 578.  
 38. Id.   
 39. Id. at 579.  
2001]                          JUDGING “NEW LAW” 703 
 
sentee ballots.40 The federal court concluded that compliance with the 
state court order would violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and entered a preliminary injunction re-
quiring the Secretary of State to omit the contested absentee ballots 
from the certified election results.41 
 Roe I resulted from the appeal of the district court’s injunction. In 
that decision, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that federal constitu-
tional interests would be implicated if the Alabama courts changed 
the state’s practice of handling the contested ballots in issue.42 As 
noted above, Roe I concluded that, in extraordinary circumstances, 
changes in state law could implicate Fourteenth Amendment princi-
ples of “fundamental fairness.”43 In elaborating on why such changes 
would do so—such as including the disputed absentee ballots if es-
tablished state law and practice was to the contrary—the Eleventh 
Circuit identified two constitutional values at stake: 
First, counting ballots that were not previously counted would di-
lute the votes of those voters who met the requirements of [state 
law] as well as those voters who actually went to the polls on elec-
tion day. Second, the change in the rules after the election would 
have the effect of disenfranchising those who would have voted but 
for the inconvenience imposed by the notarization/witness re-
quirement.44 
That is, a change in state law that had the effect of including ballots 
not previously included under state law would (1) constitute imper-
missible vote dilution and (2) disenfranchise, in effect, those voters 
who, in reliance on the previous rule, had not voted but would have 
voted had they known in advance that the rule would be what it now 
was under the new state interpretation. 
 But having established these principles, Roe I did not quickly 
jump to a substantive conclusion of its own that the Alabama courts 
had indeed violated these principles. Instead,  
Roe I . . . accommodated the diverse federal and state interests in 
disputed elections in the following way: having established the rele-
vant substantive constitutional principles, Roe I then certified to the 
Alabama Supreme Court the central question of state law: did Ala-
bama law make the contested absentee ballots legal or illegal votes? 
At the same time, the Eleventh Circuit ordered the Secretary of 
                                                                                                                    
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 581.  
 43. Id.   
 44. Id. 
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State not to certify any election results for Chief Justice and Treas-
urer, the two offices in question.45 
 In response to the Eleventh Circuit, the Alabama Supreme Court 
concluded that the ballots at issue were legal votes under state law.46 
The Eleventh Circuit then remanded the proceedings to federal dis-
trict court for extensive findings of fact on seventeen specific ques-
tions posed to determine whether the state courts had in fact 
changed preexisting state election laws following the election.47 The 
district court found that, before the contested election, Alabama “uni-
formly” excluded absentee ballots like those contested.48 The Elev-
enth Circuit subsequently concluded that the district court’s facts 
“were stronger in favor of the Roe Class than the prior panel could 
have expected” and that a change in state election practices had been 
convincingly proven.49 The district court ordered the Secretary of 
State to certify the election results for the Chief Justice and State 
Treasurer without including the contested absentee ballots. In Roe 
III, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this final judgment.50 Thus, the 
federal courts ended up holding that a state court interpretation of 
state election law changed the preexisting state law to such an extent 
that it constituted an impermissible dilution of votes under the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Roe litigation finally 
concluded almost one full year after the November 1994 election. The 
state circuit court’s restraining order was entered on November 17, 
1994, nine days after the election. The federal district court’s pre-
liminary injunction was then entered on December 5, 1994. Roe I was 
decided January 4, 1995. Roe III, which finally brought the litigation 
to a conclusion, was issued on October 13, 1995. 
 The other significant court of appeals decision on these issues is 
Griffin v. Burns,51 a First Circuit decision that provided an important 
precedent in Roe I. Griffin involved the primary for a local city coun-
cil race in Providence, Rhode Island, in which the Secretary of State 
concluded that the general election’s absentee and shut-in ballot laws 
should also be applied to primaries.52 State officials publicized the 
availability of such ballots, which ten percent of primary voters actu-
ally used.53 Thomas McCormick won the machine count but lost the 
                                                                                                                    
 45. ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 34, at 10-11; see also Roe I, 43 F.3d 
at 583. 
 46. Roe v. Mobile County Appointment Bd., 676 So. 2d 1206, 1226 (Ala. 1995).  
 47. Roe v. Alabama, 52 F.3d 300 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 908 (1995) 
[hereinafter Roe II]. 
 48. Roe v. Alabama, 68 F.3d 404 (11th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Roe III]. 
 49. Id. at 408.    
 50. Id. at 409. 
 51. 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978). 
 52. Id. at 1067. 
 53. Id.  
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total vote when these absentee ballots were included. He challenged 
the use of absentee ballots during primary elections and, in a 3 to 2 
decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that state law did not 
explicitly allow for the use of absentee ballots in primary elections.54 
Four days later, the Rhode Island Legislature amended the law to al-
low for the use of these ballots in primary elections.55 Meanwhile, 
Lloyd Griffin, whose victory over McCormick had been reversed by 
the state supreme court’s ruling, brought suit in federal district court 
(along with voters who had used the uncounted absentee ballots). 
The district court found that the state supreme court’s decision vio-
lated these voters’ constitutional rights and ordered a new primary 
election.56 
 The First Circuit affirmed.57 On the substantive federal interest, 
the First Circuit noted that the Constitution does not require states 
to provide for absentee or shut-in voting in primary elections. The 
First Circuit, like other federal courts, also cautioned that despite 
the constitutional importance of the right to vote, federal courts 
tended to intervene in state election disputes only in the most limited 
circumstances: where state laws of general applicability are uncon-
stitutional on their face, or where overt racial discrimination was in-
volved.58 In contrast, “garden variety” election irregularities involv-
ing election administration errors, malfunctioning voting machines, 
and even some claims of official misconduct, do not typically rise to 
the level of a constitutional violation, especially where the state pro-
vides adequate corrective processes.59 Nonetheless, the First Circuit 
concluded that federal intervention was warranted in this context. 
 The justification for federal intervention was similar to that in 
Roe I: where “broad-gauged unfairness permeates an election, even if 
derived from apparently neutral action” an election process can reach 
a “point of patent and fundamental unfairness” triggering a due 
process violation.60 “[D]ue process is implicated where the entire elec-
tion process—including as part thereof the state’s administrative and 
judicial corrective process—fails on its face to afford fundamental 
                                                                                                                    
 54. Id. at 1068 n.4.  
 55. Id. at 1068. The amended law was enacted at 1977 R.I. Pub. Laws 153. 
 56. Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1069.  
 57. Id. at 1079.  
 58. Id. at 1077.  
 59. As the First Circuit put it:  
If every election irregularity or contested vote involved a federal violation, the 
court would “be thrust into the details of virtually every election, tinkering 
with the state’s election machinery, reviewing petitions, registration cards, vote 
tallies, and certificates of election for all manner of error and insufficiency un-
der state and federal law.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 60. Id.  
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fairness.”61 Applying this standard, the First Circuit did not hold, as 
in Roe I, that the Rhode Island Supreme Court had unconstitution-
ally changed state law. Instead, the First Circuit compared the state 
supreme court’s decision with longstanding prior state practice; with 
the advice the relevant state administrative officials provided before 
the election; and with the state legislature’s actions both before the 
supreme court decision (allowing regular use of such ballots in pri-
maries) and after the decision (amending the law to expressly permit 
such ballots in primaries).  
 Thus the First Circuit concluded that absentee voters had rea-
sonably relied on the advice that they could cast absentee ballots. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision was so unexpected that 
excluding these ballots—around ten percent of the total ballots 
cast—would violate principles of fundamental fairness embodied in 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.62 The voters’ reli-
ance on longstanding state practice was crucial to the decision. Evi-
dence showed that a significant number of voters would have gone to 
the polls and voted in person had they known that absentee ballots 
were prohibited.63 Because Rhode Island’s Supreme Court had ruled 
that these votes were illegal, the First Circuit did not order the votes 
to be treated as legally cast.64 Instead, the First Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s use of its equitable powers to order a new primary 
election.65 
 The Griffin and Roe cases are the strongest court of appeals deci-
sions that support a constitutional role for federal courts in oversee-
ing potential “new law” that arises in the midst of elections and elec-
tion disputes. The theory on which these cases rest, as well as the 
kind of proof required to establish a violation of their principles, pro-
vides a broader framework within which to assess Bush v. Gore.66 
V.   THE THEORY OF JUDGING “NEW LAW” 
 The constitutional violation established in Roe explicitly rests on 
“two effects” that implicate constitutional due process and equal pro-
tection concerns. In addition, I will suggest a third effect that might 
be implicit but important in cases like Roe and Griffin. One question 
                                                                                                                    
 61. Id. at 1078. 
 62. Id. at 1078-79.  
 63. Id. at 1080. 
 64. Id. at 1079.  
 65. Id. at 1080.  
 66. A similar framework would explore the general jurisprudence regarding federal 
constitutional assessment of state judicial interpretations. Such a framework is provided in 
Harold J. Krent, Judging Judging: The Problem of Second-Guessing State Judges’ Inter-
pretation of State Law in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 493 (2001). Krent reaches 
similar conclusions as this Article does regarding the singularity of any “new law” basis for 
Bush v. Gore. 
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relevant to the “new law” dispute in Bush v. Gore is whether all these 
effects or only some of them ought to be required to justify federal re-
jection of state judicial interpretations.  
 The first effect centers on a bare change in state election law: the 
conclusion of a federal court that a state-court interpretation of state 
election laws effectively changes those laws. The second effect focuses 
on actual detrimental reliance of state voters on existing state elec-
tion law before the state court interpretation at issue. Is a “change” 
in state law sufficient, in and of itself, to trigger the constitutional 
violation? Or must it be a “change” that also frustrates concrete and 
specific reliance interests of voters? Note that in the Roe litigation 
there was no allegation that state officials had engaged in fraudulent 
conduct or acted with partisan intent to manipulate outcomes; the 
claim was that even apparently neutral action could amount to un-
constitutional unfairness through its effects on the electoral process. 
A.   Vote Dilution and Changes in State Law 
 The first effect is unconstitutional vote dilution that occurs when 
state election rules change to include votes not previously treated as 
legal votes under state law. Those injured would include voters who 
went to the polls and cast legal votes or who cast legal absentee 
votes; a change in state law that permits previously illegal votes to 
be counted then, apparently, dilutes the votes legally cast. Notice 
that in the view of the Roe I court, it does not matter whether state 
law is being “liberally” interpreted to admit disputed votes or “strin-
gently” interpreted to exclude disputed votes; if state law has been 
changed, the constitutional violation occurs. According to Roe I, just 
as excluding ballots might deny the right to vote, including ballots 
that prior law requires be excluded is vote dilution—a form of ballot-
box stuffing—and just as unconstitutional. Some federal courts, in 
contrast, conclude that state court rulings which enfranchise voters, 
rather than excluding them, should be given much greater deference. 
On this view, state rulings enfranchising voters can never amount to 
unconstitutional vote dilution, or if they can, the standard for prov-
ing that a franchise-expanding ruling is an impermissible change in 
state law is higher.67 Roe I rejects this asymmetry, most likely be-
cause the constitutional interest is in ensuring the integrity and fun-
                                                                                                                    
 67. In Partido Nuevo Progresista v. Barreto Perez, 639 F.2d 825, 828 (1st. Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981), for example, the First Circuit rejected a “new law” argu-
ment by noting that the purported ruling would expand, rather than contract, the fran-
chise. But the First Circuit also noted that there had been no detrimental reliance on the 
purported prior law, unlike in the First Circuit’s earlier decision in Griffin; hence, the al-
ternative grounds for decision make even Partido Nuevo less than a clear holding that 
changes in state election law can never amount to unconstitutional vote dilution if those 
changes expand the franchise. Id. 
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damental fairness of elections. That integrity can be violated just as 
readily by changing state law to add votes as by changing state law 
to subtract votes. 
 Even under this expansive conception of unconstitutional vote di-
lution, federal courts recognize the need to distinguish between ordi-
nary disputes over counting ballots and state practices that reach the 
point of “patent and fundamental unfairness.”68 But suppose a fed-
eral court simply disagrees with a state court interpretation of the 
state’s election laws, when the consequence of any judicial decision is 
to include or exclude certain ballots. If the federal court believes that 
state law requires excluding certain ballots, would Roe mean that 
unconstitutional vote dilution would occur were the state court to in-
terpret state law differently and conclude that those ballots should 
be included? Or, if the state court excludes certain ballots, and the 
federal courts believe state law requires inclusion of such ballots, is 
this tantamount to unconstitutional vote dilution against voters 
whose votes have been excluded? There is a risk, certainly, that the 
principle of Roe would turn every dispute over the interpretation of 
state election law into a federal constitutional question. How trou-
bling that risk is depends on how strong the evidence must be that a 
state court interpretation actually changes existing state law. 
 The question then becomes how convinced a federal court ought to 
be, with what evidentiary basis, that a state judicial decision changes 
state election practices enough to amount to a federal constitutional 
violation. We can imagine a spectrum of possible contexts. At one 
end, the prior state law can be embodied not only in written legal 
texts but in longstanding judicial and administrative practices con-
sistent with those texts. The more the specific issue has been regu-
larly confronted, particularly in contexts analogous to that at issue, 
the more possible it becomes to have a firmly anchored set of baseline 
laws and practices against which federal courts can assess any po-
tential “changes” in state practices. In such a case, a federal court 
has a body of well-grounded evidence to draw on in assessing 
whether one particular state judicial ruling is a sharp departure 
from preexisting state rules. 
 That was precisely the situation in the Roe litigation. The Elev-
enth Circuit did not just offer its own free-standing interpretation of 
the meaning of Alabama law. Nor did the Eleventh Circuit base its 
interpretation solely on the words of a single state statute. Instead, 
that court came to judgment only after extensive proceedings to test 
the “new law” question in both state and lower federal courts. Most 
importantly, the federal district court, after a lengthy trial, had made 
the following factual findings: (1) every county in Alabama (except 
                                                                                                                    
 68. Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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one) had consistently and for years excluded absentee ballots like 
those contested; (2) the Secretary of State had consistently main-
tained that ballots like those contested were not to be counted and 
had instructed every voting official in the State to that effect; (3) not 
one election official testified to the court that the contested ballots 
would ordinarily be included; and (4) had voters known they could 
have voted absentee under laxer standards, many more might have 
voted.69 In light of this longstanding, unequivocal, consistent state 
practice, the district court concluded that the state circuit court’s de-
cision to include the ballots was an “abominable” postelection change 
of practice that amounted to unconstitutional “ballot-box stuffing.”70 
 Now consider the other end of the spectrum. Suppose a state has 
an election law on the books that has not been tested or applied with 
any frequency (if at all) and hence has not been the subject of exten-
sive judicial or administrative elaboration. Indeed, suppose the stat-
ute has never been applied to the type of election currently before the 
state courts. When the state courts interpret such a statute in the 
midst of this kind of election, what baseline can the federal courts 
use to assess whether that state interpretation is a dramatic “change 
in state law”? If there is limited or no evidence of actual prior state 
practices on the matter, nor even official positions that the Secretary 
of State has taken in advance and instructed state officials to follow, 
what kind of evidence can the federal court possibly look at to deter-
mine whether judicial interpretation has become an “abominable” 
postelection change? 
 In such a situation, the federal courts can hardly do anything 
other than second-guess whether the state court has read the statute 
the same way the federal court would, if the federal court had the 
power to interpret state law itself in the first instance. For virtually 
the only evidence the federal court would have before it would be the 
text of the state statute itself. Perhaps, in some states, the federal 
court would also have whatever legislative history was relevant—
though, as is often the case, the state legislature might have enacted 
the statute without any thought at all about its application to the 
particular kind of election matter currently at issue. Yet this infor-
mation, mostly confined to the text of the statute itself, is exactly the 
same information before the state court. If the federal court has no 
more than the text alone upon which to draw, is there a sufficient 
prior established state-law practice that ought to justify the “ex-
traordinary” federal constitutional intervention that is warranted 
only when matters of “patent and fundamental unfairness” are in-
volved? 
                                                                                                                    
 69. Roe v. Mobile County Appointing Bd., 904 F. Supp. 1315, 1335 (S.D. Ala. 1995). 
 70. Id. 
710  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:691 
 
 Even federal courts most aggressive in developing the “law of new 
law” have continually acknowledged that the task of doctrine in this 
area is to distinguish ordinary state election disputes from matters 
that warrant the extraordinary intervention of constitutional law be-
cause some “abominable” or comparable change in law has turned 
the election. Yet if a particular election context can only involve dif-
ferences in views between state and federal courts over how state 
laws ought to be interpreted, where those differences cannot be 
grounded in anything other than the words of the particular statute 
itself—because there is no longstanding state practice one way or the 
other—how readily should federal courts conclude that a constitu-
tional violation has occurred? At this pole of the spectrum of possible 
“new law” cases, there is a real danger that federal courts will simply 
substitute their own judgment about the proper meaning of state law 
rather than ensuring that the state acts consistently with its own 
prior laws and practices. This is precisely the intrusion on state in-
terests that the architecture of the “new law” doctrine, taken as a 
whole, is designed to guard against. Ensuring meaningful consis-
tency of state election practices is supposed to be the defining consti-
tutional interest that justifies federal oversight, at least through the 
general commands of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 
B.   Detrimental Reliance, Due Process, and Constitutional Violations 
 Roe I identified not one but two constitutional defects that justi-
fied constitutional intervention. The first is vote dilution that can oc-
cur from sharp changes in state law, whether they expand or con-
tract the franchise.71 The second effect rests on detrimental reliance 
and appears to implicate values of due process rather than the anti-
dilution principle of equally-weighted votes.72 Here the constitutional 
question is whether the purportedly “new” state rule—had it been 
specified clearly in advance—would have led (or might have led) sig-
nificant numbers of nonvoters to vote. In other words, the second 
constitutional concern is that voters and potential voters acted in re-
liance on a well-justified belief that state law required or permitted 
X, where X is a condition of casting a valid vote. Where X is a re-
quired condition of voting, and state institutions conclude after an 
election that X was not actually required, voters who would have 
voted (or might have voted) had they known X was not required have 
had their constitutional rights violated. Similarly, where X is a per-
mitted mode of voting, but state institutions conclude, after ballots 
have been cast, that X is not a permitted mode, voters who would 
have voted (or might have voted) in some alternative mode have also 
                                                                                                                    
 71. Roe I, 43 F.3d at 581. 
 72. Id. 
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had their rights violated. In either case, because voters appropriately 
relied to their detriment on a well-grounded belief that state law was 
X, their due process rights—of fair notice with regard to conditions 
on the right to vote—have been violated. 
 This theory of detrimental reliance as the basis of constitutional 
injury was also implicated in Roe I. The disputed state judicial inter-
pretation of Alabama law made it easier for voters to cast absentee 
ballots. Thus, according to the Roe I court, the postelection change in 
interpretation “disenfranchised” those who would have voted but for 
the more onerous absentee ballot restrictions previous state practice 
had imposed.73 Because voters notified in advance of the “new rule” 
might well have voted, the retroactive adoption of this rule violated 
their due process rights. Griffin’s “changed law” holding is grounded 
even more strongly in the fact of detrimental reliance. As noted 
above, plaintiffs produced evidence that, had they known in advance 
that absentee voting would not be permitted, at least some of them 
would have gone to the polls.74 
 Thus, Roe I and Griffin, which stand as examples of federal case 
law most willing to find an unconstitutional state creation of “new 
law,” involved both vote dilution and detrimental reliance. A key 
question about this line of cases is, thus, whether both effects are 
necessary to establish this constitutional violation. It is not hard to 
imagine a state judicial decision that arguably changes state election 
law, but not in a way that could plausibly be said to deny due process 
by effectively disenfranchising voters who would otherwise have 
voted had they known of the new rule. Under the Roe-Griffin line of 
cases, would such a state court interpretation violate the Constitu-
tion? Whether either vote dilution or detrimental reliance, standing 
alone, is sufficient to establish a violation, or whether both are neces-
sary, had not been resolved in the lower courts at the time of Bush v. 
Gore. Yet as we will see, once we identify these two potential justifi-
cations, there will be no need to untangle the precise relationship be-
tween them in order to assess Bush v. Gore itself through the frame-
work these cases offer. 
C.   Structural Considerations and Elections: When is Distrust 
of State Courts Most Appropriate? 
 Though neither Roe nor Griffin mentions this factor, a third ele-
ment leaps out from both cases. Both involve state judiciaries—
indeed, elected state judiciaries—ruling on disputed elections for 
state offices. Indeed, Roe involves the remarkable prospect of the 
Alabama Supreme Court potentially deciding who has been validly 
                                                                                                                    
 73. Id.  
 74. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1080 (1st Cir. 1978).  
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elected to be the next Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court. 
Much of the constitutional law of democracy makes the federal judi-
cial role turn on structural circumstances in which other decision-
makers, such as state legislatures, are too strongly self-interested in 
the matter at hand to be left free of constitutional oversight. This is 
the functional justification the Supreme Court centrally relied on, for 
example, when it decided that state legislative districting plans 
should be subject to federal constitutional scrutiny.75 As John Hart 
Ely famously put it, post-1938 Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
found constitutional intervention most readily justified when democ-
ratic institutions are potentially compromised and hence to be dis-
trusted with respect to particular issues; much of modern constitu-
tional law treats this distrust as present when democratic institu-
tions are potentially self-interested players in the issue at hand.76 
 It is hard not to be anxious at the image of an elected state judici-
ary deciding who has been validly elected its next Chief Justice. If 
constitutional law recognizes a general bar against “new law” in the 
election context, perhaps the degree to which federal courts aggres-
sively scrutinize such claims should turn—or implicitly does turn—
on the extent to which alternative decisionmakers, such as state 
courts, are to be viewed skeptically in light of their potentially com-
promised position. Such a view would not require a romanticized 
view of federal courts as always impartial and detached from these 
electoral conflicts; the issue is the more pragmatic one of relative in-
stitutional position and relative institutional detachment. That the 
Alabama Supreme Court would be a more troubling forum than the 
Eleventh Circuit in deciding who holds the highest elective offices in 
Alabama, or that the Rhode Island Supreme Court is a potentially 
less detached actor than the First Circuit in making rulings that af-
fect the outcome of state and local races, does not seem farfetched. As 
I have said, this kind of structural analysis is characteristic of much 
of the modern law of democracy.77 Of course, it is unlikely that fed-
                                                                                                                    
 75. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).    
 76. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75-
77, 101-03 (1980). Looking backward, Ely’s theoretical framework was doctrinally rooted in 
Carolene Products, in which the Court itself self-consciously announced that more exacting 
judicial scrutiny might be appropriate for legislation which “restricts those political proc-
esses which can ordinarily be expected” to provide legitimacy to democratic outcomes. 
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Looking forward, Ely’s 
framework has been extended to suggest a variety of other legal regulations legislators 
have used in the past and the present, beyond those recognized in Ely’s work, to seek to 
perpetuate their political power—regulations for which similarly exacting judicial scrutiny 
is arguably appropriate, though the current Court fails to engage in such scrutiny in these 
contexts. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lock-
ups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998). 
 77. For an extended analysis of the law of democracy in these terms, see Issacharoff & 
Pildes, supra note 76. 
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eral courts would mention such considerations in their decisions. 
Moreover, perhaps this unarticulated posture of distrust is more jus-
tifiable for some state election contexts rather than others; Roe af-
fords a powerful example of a context in which such distrust might be 
most appropriate. 
 If the relative structural positions of state and federal courts 
ought to play a role in applying the “new law” doctrine, a paradoxical 
result would follow. Federal court scrutiny under the “new law” doc-
trine should be strongest, on this view, in state elections, particularly 
those for the highest state offices. For it is here that federal courts 
might be thought to have the greatest structural advantage over 
state institutions, if reasons do exist for greater skepticism of state 
courts in state election contexts. Yet at the same time any such 
structural federal-court advantage would dissolve when federal elec-
tions are at stake. One need not be more skeptical of federal courts 
than state courts when federal elections are involved to believe that 
federal courts have no unique structural advantage that would in-
cline them toward greater impartiality in federal elections.78 
 This structural analysis is merely meant to be suggestive. 
Whether it would be sound for federal courts to tighten the screws on 
“new law” doctrine depending on their judgment about the relative 
impartiality of state actors—either for a category of election contests 
or on a (more controversial) context-by-context basis—is a sensitive 
proposition. But for current purposes, it is enough to note the dis-
tinctly compelling structural context for federal oversight present in 
Roe and, to a lesser extent, perhaps also in Griffin. For with this 
analysis of the actual and possible underpinnings of the case law in 
place, it is now possible to gain some traction in assessing the United 
States Supreme Court’s obvious and dominating concern that the 
Florida Supreme Court was creating “new law” in the midst of resolv-
ing the 2000 election. 
VI.   BUSH V. GORE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF “NEW LAW” 
MORE BROADLY 
 The pre-Bush v. Gore development, in at least some federal courts, 
of constitutional constraints against “new” state election law reveals 
a rejection of the strong federalist position that states and local gov-
ernments should continue to have full autonomy over administration 
of state election rules, even for national contests. At the same time, 
                                                                                                                    
 78. I leave to the side here longstanding debates about whether the general institu-
tional features of federal courts, including lifetime tenure, should be viewed as making 
those courts more likely than state courts to decide certain matters more in accord with the 
ideals of judging. My focus is on uniquely distinctive features of both federal and state 
courts of special relevance in the electoral context. 
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this lower court jurisprudence identifies and suggests specific ele-
ments necessary to prove that state courts have indeed changed state 
law sufficiently to justify the otherwise extraordinary prospect of 
federal oversight. The principle against “new law,” therefore, has 
been given a rule-bound, circumscribed content in those courts that 
have developed it; this rule-bound approach is designed to accommo-
date the competing interests—in protecting the constitutional di-
mensions of the right to vote and in protecting the values associated 
with decentralized implementation of that right—while doing so in a 
way that produces consistent, principled, transparent doctrine. The 
Roe-Griffin line of cases shows the greatest willingness among lower 
federal courts to enforce “new law” doctrine, and the question now is 
how Bush v. Gore compares to the framework for the most aggressive 
prior applications of “new law” doctrine. That is, accepting that there 
should be some constitutional constraint against new election law, 
are the same elements present in Bush v. Gore that justified the most 
stringent prior applications of such a doctrine? 
 Briefly put, the answer is no. Indeed, none of the factors previ-
ously necessary to trigger a finding of impermissible “new law” were 
present in Bush v. Gore. This in itself does not establish that Bush v. 
Gore is wrong in its “new law” concerns. But it does help to pin down 
more precisely how idiosyncratic are the conclusions of Justices and 
academic commentators that the Florida court made “new law” when 
those conclusions are compared to the most aggressive prior applica-
tions of this doctrine. Thus, while some have assailed Bush v. Gore 
for its willingness to intrude at all into judgments of state law, the 
point here is different: even if there are sound constitutional princi-
ples that support federal oversight of state rulings on election law, 
the specific elements previously thought to justify overturning state 
rulings were absent in Bush v. Gore.  
 The per curiam decision rested on more than just a judgment 
about new law, of course; central to the Court’s decision was the sub-
stantive and procedural equal protection ruling that different coun-
ties could not adopt different standards, in the middle of the recount 
process, as to what constitutes a valid vote. The analysis here does 
not address those issues.79 But to the extent the threat that Florida 
courts were making “new law” loomed over the entire case and influ-
enced not just the concurrence but the general atmosphere in which 
Bush v. Gore was heard, the analysis here does suggest how that 
sense of threat was untethered to any of the specific elements federal 
courts had previously thought to be required to justify concluding 
that state courts had unconstitutionally made new election law. 
                                                                                                                    
 79. The best justification of the Court’s equal protection holding is Einer Elhauge, The 
Lessons of Florida 2000, 111 POL’Y REV. 15 (2001-02). 
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 In the remaining pages, I will quickly suggest why the specific 
elements typically present in “new law” cases were absent from the 
2000 election litigation. 
A.   Vote Dilution 
 As noted above, election contests can arise across a spectrum of 
contexts which vary in how firm a basis prior state law and practice 
provide for any federal court assessment of whether state court in-
terpretations change that prior law. The presidential election dispute 
in Florida arose, it turns out, all the way at one extreme of this spec-
trum. Florida law provided for the protest and the contest of disputed 
elections.80 Yet unlike in Roe or Griffin, nothing comparable in the 
prior administrative practice of implementing these laws or in prior 
Florida judicial decisions—or in the apparent legislative history and 
context of the statutes themselves—could convincingly establish a 
clear prior practice or interpretation of the disputed laws. Each side, 
of course, argued (as its role required) that the prior law was clear. 
But leaving aside the inevitable and interminable debates about how 
to read an isolated Florida case or two, the reality is that prior Flor-
ida law and practice were not firmly established enough to enable the 
current Florida Supreme Court’s decisions to be “objectively” as-
sessed—that is, judged in a way that would generate a high degree of 
consensus among legally informed observers. This conclusion is not 
surprising in light of several factors. 
 First, with respect to the actual election laws themselves, there is 
little doubt that Florida’s laws simply were not written with a presi-
dential election contest in mind. Even in the frenzy of the litigation 
itself, it appeared from the face of these laws that the enacting Flor-
ida Legislature had not given a moment’s thought to how the laws 
ought to be applied to a presidential election. The presidential elec-
tion process poses myriad unique issues, not the least of which is the 
presence of federally-imposed deadlines that require any vote count 
and possible dispute to be resolved by certain dates. A number of 
state laws distinguish between processes for contesting state and lo-
cal elections and the process for contesting a presidential election. 
But Florida law (along with that of some other states) makes no such 
distinction.81 Since the election, enough time has passed to enable de-
                                                                                                                    
 80. FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2000), amended by Fla. Election Reform Act of 2001, 2001 
Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 42, at 149, 152 (protest); FLA. STAT. § 102.168 (2000), amended by 2001 
Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 44, at 149, 153 (contest). 
 81. See Eric Schickler et al., Safe at Any Speed: Legislative Intent, The Electoral 
Count Act of 1887, and Bush v. Gore, 16 J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 42, 
on file with the Florida State University Law Review). In a 1960 survey, the election con-
test legislation of nineteen states expressly dealt separately with presidential elections. 
Florida was listed as one of seventeen states whose election contest legislation referred 
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tailed studies of the legislative background of Florida election law, 
including the most recent preelection revision of those laws. These 
studies confirm what seemed apparent from the laws themselves: no 
evidence has been discovered to suggest that the Florida Legislature 
ever thought about the federal election calendar and the relevant 
federal statutory provisions, or that the legislature even focused at 
all on presidential elections when it wrote or revised the election-
dispute laws. When the Florida Legislature enacted these laws, its 
sole focus was local and state elections.82 
 Second, even with respect to the elections the Florida Legislature 
did focus on, these laws were still badly drafted and incomplete. They 
failed to answer many of the obvious questions such laws need to ad-
dress. Further, these laws were laced with provisions arguably in 
tension with each other—in part, perhaps, because different aspects 
of those laws had been enacted in different years. To a greater degree 
than judges often admit, these gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities often 
form the context in which courts must interpret the law. But as one 
who has examined the election laws in many states, I can attest that 
even by this lenient standard, Florida’s laws at the time of the 2000 
election were among the least well-drafted, least precise in the coun-
try. 
 When inartful laws are not written with specific contexts in mind, 
it is hardly surprising if their application to those contexts is uncer-
tain. But incomplete or uncertain state law will often take on more 
settled meaning through ongoing applications of that law, which can 
occur in administrative or judicial proceedings. Here, however, a 
third factor emerged: preexisting Florida administrative and judicial 
practice had not contributed to establishing a clear set of resolutions 
for the kind of issues that arose in the 2000 election.  
 Uncontradicted assertions at oral argument before the Florida 
Supreme Court stated that the last statewide contest of an election in 
Florida had been in 1916 for the Governor’s office83—long before the 
current statutes had been enacted. As a result, no clear administra-
tive practice had emerged about issues such as the circumstances for 
                                                                                                                    
generally to contests for “any office” or any “public office.” Other states had varying provi-
sions in common law or statutory law. See L. Kinvin Wroth, Election Contests and the Elec-
toral Vote, 65 DICK. L. REV. 321, 338-39 (1961). The Florida contest of election provision in 
2000 simply referred to contesting the election or nomination of “any person to office.” FLA. 
STAT. § 102.168(1) (amended 2001). 
 82. Schickler et al., supra note 81, at 49 (“[A]lthough Florida lawmakers have repeat-
edly considered and revised their election statutes in recent decades, there is simply no 
evidence that legislators were ever mindful of the federal election calendar in general or of 
the Electoral Count Act’s safe harbor provision in particular.”). 
 83. See Full Text of Dec. 7 Florida Supreme Court Hearing, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
available at http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/nationworld/sns-2000election120700fla 
courttext.story.  
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statewide races in which recounts were permitted or how they had to 
be conducted. Similarly, previous Florida judicial decisions had not 
resolved the ambiguities and gaps in these statutes enough to pro-
vide determinate guidance—in advance of the 2000 election as to 
what meaning these unclear statutes would be given. With respect to 
a few issues, isolated decisions were arguably on point, though even 
then their implication for statewide issues was unclear. One county 
might have adopted a prior standard as to what constituted a valid 
vote, and one intermediate appellate court had concluded that un-
dervotes arising from alleged technological errors could not justify a 
manual recount.84 But there simply was no well-established, “thick” 
body of authoritative state law or administrative practice of signifi-
cance that bore on the question of how Florida applied these dis-
puted-election statutes to a statewide election contest. 
 Contrast this with the “new law” situations in Roe I and Griffin. 
In Roe, the district court found, after a three-day factual trial, that 
for at least the fifteen preceding years, the consistent, actual practice 
of sixty-six of Alabama’s sixty-seven counties had been to exclude the 
specific kind of absentee ballot at issue there.85 In addition, the “con-
sistent and plain”86 position of the Secretary of State, which had been 
communicated in writing to every voting official in the state, had al-
ways been that absentee ballots of the kind in dispute had to be ex-
cluded. As the District Court put it, this had been a “bright-line rule” 
in Alabama.87 Similarly, in Griffin, the court of appeals found that 
the ballots in dispute had been treated as valid ballots according to 
“long-standing practice;” that state officials charged with running the 
election had presented the ballots as valid to voters; that the Secre-
tary of State considered the ballots valid; and that the divided state 
supreme court decision stood in the face of these longstanding prac-
tices and formal administrative interpretations and actions.88 
 No record of this sort came close to existing in Florida. Indeed, one 
might hazard the view that any of the state judicial bodies that be-
came involved in the litigation, including the Florida Supreme Court, 
would have been more than pleased had the prior law or election 
practice been more clearly settled than it was. Few judges, I suspect, 
would relish having themselves and their institutions thrust into a 
                                                                                                                    
 84. On the existence of prior established counting rules, see, for example, POSNER, 
supra note 10, at 122 (stating that particular rule was “followed by the Palm Beach can-
vassing board in previous elections”). For an example of the use of the appellate case, see 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 120 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Broward County 
Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (contending that Florida law 
does not require “the counting of improperly marked ballots”)). 
 85. Roe v. Mobile County Appointing Bd., 904 F. Supp. 1315, 1335 (S.D. Ala. 1995).  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1076 (1st Cir. 1978). 
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national arena on the most partisan of issues; most judges might well 
hope that the prior law would be clear enough to insulate them from 
an almost inevitable firestorm of criticism that would result which-
ever way they would rule. But despite all the litigation, none of the 
lawyers on either side appeared able to establish a clear Florida ad-
ministrative or judicial practice on many of the disputed issues. 
Moreover, the concurring U.S. Supreme Court Justices who con-
cluded that the Florida Supreme Court had unconstitutionally cre-
ated new law were also unable to support this judgment by pointing 
to the kinds of records or facts or patterns of practice that had been 
present in Roe and Griffin. And the academic commentary that has 
endorsed Bush v. Gore on the grounds that the Florida Supreme 
Court decisions violated Article II—essentially, the grounds that that 
court had created “new law”—has similarly offered no well-
established set of administrative practices or judicial rulings in Flor-
ida that would provide a firm baseline against which to measure the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decisions. To be sure, critics and supporters 
of Bush v. Gore wave individual past decisions around from which 
they argue that prior law favored one side or the other. But both 
sides are required to make inferences, at best, from isolated decisions 
that do not directly address the specific practices at issue in any way 
comparable to the kind of firmly anchored baselines present in Roe 
and Griffin. 
 The dispute between the United States Supreme Court and the 
Florida Supreme Court thus could not boil down to anything other 
than a dispute over how to read the bare state election statutes 
themselves. Realistically, unlike in Roe and Griffin, no robust and 
meaningful evidence, external to the texts of those statutes, could 
enable federal court oversight of state court interpretation to rest on 
anything other than the statutory texts. At this point, federal and 
state courts can engage only in a head-on debate about how best to 
read these texts as texts—texts which were poorly drafted from the 
start and were not written with a presidential election in mind. No 
doubt, different judges and courts would come to different conclu-
sions on many of the unsettled and ambiguous issues in Florida’s 
election laws. But framed within the broader perspective of constitu-
tional constraints on new election law, the question is whether fed-
eral courts should play a role at all in judging state court interpreta-
tions in the specific context in which federal court “oversight” of state 
institutions can be based on little more than disagreement about how 
best to read the bare texts of state laws. 
 Let us accept that the Constitution should constrain state courts 
from developing “new law” in the guise of interpreting existing law. 
The question, then, is not whether it is inappropriate for federal 
courts ever to intrude on the rulings of state courts about their own 
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election laws. In striking the balance between the national constitu-
tional interests at stake and the values associated with decentralized 
control over elections, the important question becomes how strong 
and convincing the evidence ought to be before federal courts should 
hold state court interpretation equivalent to unconstitutional ma-
nipulation—manipulation being, in essence, what the “new law” doc-
trine was designed to guard against. That is the question too quickly 
overlooked in disputes between those who assert that states should 
retain full control of the meaning of their election laws and those who 
are prepared to turn their disagreement with the Florida Supreme 
Court’s reading of state law into a justification for United States Su-
preme Court intervention. The pre-Bush v. Gore “new law” constitu-
tional doctrine had developed to try to avoid either of these extremes 
and to accommodate the competing concerns behind the right to vote, 
on the one hand, and state decisionmaking, on the other.  
 Recall that, under that doctrine, state decisions had to constitute 
an “abominable” change in state practice in order to justify “extraor-
dinary” federal constitutional intervention. Such federal intervention 
was necessary to ensure that no “patent and fundamental unfair-
ness” was present that rose to the level of a federal constitutional vio-
lation. But when federal courts lack any firm anchor in a clear set of 
established prior practices, the central evidence of any purported 
change in state law can only be the text of the relevant statutes 
themselves and arguments about how best to interpret them. Should 
federal courts play a role at all in assessing state decisions when 
there is no evidence on which to anchor that judgment other than the 
very statutes being interpreted? Recall also that the purpose behind 
the factors identified to justify federal intervention in the prior “new 
law” cases was to protect national interests in the “fundamental fair-
ness” of elections but, at the same time, to avoid turning every dis-
puted state election law ruling into a federal constitutional question. 
Yet if mere disagreement about how best to read the text of state 
laws can be transformed into a constitutional issue, every dispute 
about state election law is indeed capable, in principle, of being 
turned into fodder for constitutional law. 
 Judge Richard Posner has mounted the most sustained academic 
defense of Bush v. Gore.89 Doctrinally, he is prepared to defend the 
decision only on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court did in-
deed change prior state election law; he rejects the per curiam’s al-
ternative ground that the recount process violated equal protection. 
                                                                                                                    
 89. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 10; Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore: Prolegomenon 
to an Assessment, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore: Reply to 
Friedman, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 871 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and 
Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1 (2000).  
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But the tepid crescendo of Judge Posner’s defense is only that 
“[r]easonable judges could conclude that the Florida supreme court 
had so far disregarded the law as to violate [the Constitution.]”90 And 
Judge Posner acknowledges that this “is a difficult issue.”91 Even if 
Judge Posner is right, the more pressing question should be whether 
that is enough. If competing interpretations of state election law are 
reasonable, should the federal system be structured so that federal 
courts have the power to make their interpretations prevail, when 
they have no more basis on which to condemn state courts than con-
trary views about how best to interpret legal texts? Certainly Roe 
and Griffin presented something considerably more compelling. 
Given the detailed evidence established in those cases, most federal 
judges would surely have concluded that state courts had changed 
state law. But that is a far different standard of proof than the one 
upon which Judge Posner’s “new law” defense of Bush v. Gore re-
lies.92 
 When potential conflicts between federal and state courts come 
down to little more than how best to read statutory texts—
particularly those replete with seeming gaps and ambiguities—the 
difference in interpretation will frequently amount to a philosophical 
difference over how courts should generally go about interpreting 
statutes. This classic jurisprudential problem is one to which the 
American legal system does not offer any general answer. Put sim-
plistically, two polar positions can be identified: purposive versus 
textual interpretation. In the former, courts conceive themselves to 
be in partnership with the legislature; the role of courts is to dis-
cover, as best as possible, the general purposes for which laws have 
been passed and then to further those purposes through acts of in-
terpretation in cases where the statute’s reach is otherwise unclear. 
Courts that emphasize textual interpretation, by contrast, tend to 
see themselves less as legislative partners and more as faithful 
agents; such courts view the legislature to have expressed its purpose 
through the text of the statute itself. The court’s role is to apply the 
text according to its terms. With purposive interpretation, courts 
take an active role in seeking to harmonize statutory schemes as a 
                                                                                                                    
 90. Electronic Dialogue from Judge Richard A. Posner to Professor Alan M. Dershow-
itz, supra note 9. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Ultimately, Judge Posner would defend the result in Bush v. Gore on pragmatic, 
rather than doctrinal, grounds. His central argument is that the consequences of allowing 
the election dispute to continue would have been bad enough for the country that the Court 
should have terminated that dispute for that reason, as long as there were some plausible 
constitutional footing for doing so. My own view, based on the Court’s pattern of decisions 
in other cases involving the structure of democratic processes, is that pragmatic reasons of 
this sort likely did play a more important role than doctrinal considerations in Bush v. 
Gore. See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695 (2001). 
2001]                          JUDGING “NEW LAW” 721 
 
whole, or to fill in gaps and ambiguities according to judicial judg-
ments about the underlying legislative purpose. With textual inter-
pretation, courts hew as closely as possible to the specific terms of 
the written text, without further judgments about whether direct 
textual application appears to advance what the courts view as the 
legislature’s underlying objectives. 
 Which of these views prevailed in American law before the 2000 
election? Neither. There was no clearly established prior law, at the 
general methodological level, regarding how statutes ought to be in-
terpreted. Rather, the answer has varied both over time and between 
different courts within our radically decentralized system of legal au-
thority. Purposive methods, for example, more or less dominated 
within the United States Supreme Court from the 1950s to the 
1980s. Since then, certain Justices have argued strongly for textual 
interpretation. That textual approach has gained strength in recent 
years, though the Court is now internally divided on these questions. 
The answer also varies throughout the American legal system; this is 
not the kind of question on which the Supreme Court can impose a 
uniform approach on all courts. Nor can it be said that the general 
intellectual culture of law in the United States, today, generally en-
dorses one of these methods to the exclusion of the other. 
 Faced with ineptly drafted election laws, the Florida Supreme 
Court took what it considered a purposive approach and sought to 
adapt a statutory scheme, written with only state and local recounts 
in mind, to the context of a presidential election. As far as I can tell, 
this Florida Supreme Court regularly engages in purposive interpre-
tation of statutes, in election and many other cases. On the other 
hand, several members of the United States Supreme Court fervently 
believe it is precisely these open-ended methods of purposive inter-
pretation that allow courts to impose their own views of desired out-
comes on statutory schemes; for that reason, these Justices strongly 
embrace textual interpretation. It is these Justices who focused their 
constitutional rejection (based technically on Article II, Section 1 of 
the United States Constitution) of the Florida court’s decision on the 
latter court’s statutory interpretations. So vehement were these tex-
tually committed Supreme Court Justices—Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas—that they excoriated the Florida 
Supreme Court in the most disparaging rhetoric: the Florida court’s 
readings were “absurd,” ones “[n]o reasonable person” would endorse, 
and “plainly departed from the legislative scheme.”93 From a textual-
ist’s perspective, purposive interpreters regularly depart from the 
legislative scheme; it is in the very nature of purposive interpretation 
to do so. At the same time, these critical Supreme Court Justices do 
                                                                                                                    
 93. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 118-19 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).    
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regularly demand fidelity to legislative text as text: their textualism 
also applies across different statutory contexts. To the extent the Su-
preme Court majority viewed the Florida Supreme Court as a run-
away court,94 much of that belief might ultimately have stemmed 
from fundamentally different philosophies of statutory interpreta-
tion—philosophies the concurring Supreme Court Justices and the 
Florida Supreme Court majority each apply with some consistency, 
yet which differ radically from each other. 
 In sum, new election law has previously been held to become un-
constitutional vote dilution only when prior state practice had estab-
lished a firm baseline against which the claim of new law could be 
tested. In Bush v. Gore, by contrast, the dispute over “new law” es-
sentially came down to a dispute over how to read the bare statutory 
text alone. Any such dispute will implicate philosophical views about 
proper methods of statutory interpretation, views that may differ 
across courts, though any one court might consistently adhere to a 
particular approach. The central question about a “new law” defense 
of Bush v. Gore is whether these kinds of differences—over how to 
read statutes when their meaning is not previously settled in fairly 
unequivocal ways, as in Roe and Griffin—should provide enough of a 
basis to justify federal court overturning of state court interpreta-
tions of state law. 
B.   Detrimental Reliance 
 Detrimental reliance of individual voters on the “prior” law is ei-
ther necessary or sufficient in the Roe-Griffin line for arguable 
changes in state law to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 
In the legal sense, this detrimental reliance has a specific meaning: 
voters who relied on the purported prior state of the law would (or 
might) have acted differently had they known that law not to be cor-
rect. There is no basis I can see for finding such detrimental reliance 
in Bush v. Gore, even assuming that any of the Florida Supreme 
Court rulings “changed” the state’s prior election laws. Recall the 
kind of legal rulings at issue: whether to permit manual recounts ab-
sent a showing of machine error; whether to count as valid ballots 
that had been marked in particular ways; whether to permit 
amended returns from selective hand recounts to be included in the 
precertification vote totals; and whether to permit a postcertification 
contest of an election which involved extensive hand recounts of “un-
dervoted” ballots across numerous counties. 
 Whatever else might be said about these decisions, if they do con-
stitute a change of law, they do not do so in a way that would impli-
                                                                                                                    
 94. David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
737, 751-55 (2001). 
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cate detrimental reliance on the part of voters comparable to that in 
Roe and Griffin. Would any voters be able to claim plausibly that had 
they known the Florida Supreme Court would have authorized hand 
recounts, those voters would have acted in some different way—
somehow changed their voting practices? Take the much disputed is-
sue of what constituted a valid vote on a punch-card ballot: a claim of 
detrimental reliance would amount to voters asserting that, had they 
known they could get a vote counted without fully punching out the 
chad on a punch-card ballot, they would have done so. That any voter 
who did not vote could plausibly claim, as in Griffin, that they would 
have turned out at the polls had they only known a partially punched 
chad would be treated as a valid vote seems implausible. And that 
voters who did the work required to punch out the actual chad could 
claim that their constitutional reliance interests were violated be-
cause they had to do more work than state law turned out actually to 
require is just as implausible. The same seems true of the other is-
sues in dispute. Because those disputes involved relatively obscure 
issues of the vote counting and recount process, it is hard to imagine 
that any voters or nonvoters structured their conduct around existing 
law and would have been likely to act differently had they known the 
law would emerge as it did from the Florida Supreme Court. 
 Detrimental reliance, in the legal sense recognized in Roe and 
Griffin, and more generally throughout the law, is not an abstract 
expectation, hope, or desire that the law remain the same. In the 
election context, the claim requires a more concrete and tangible ef-
fect than that voters had voted in reliance on a fair election system, 
and that the courts were depriving them of that expectation by 
changing the rules of the game through “new law” creation. The con-
cept requires a specific change of position in reliance on the existing 
law, a change of position that would not have been made had the ac-
tor known the law to be different. In the election context, individual 
voters would have to be able to establish that the courts had retroac-
tively changed the election process in a way to which those voters 
would have self-protectively responded ex ante had they known of 
the change in advance. Whatever the merits of the Florida court de-
cisions, I cannot see any plausible claim of detrimental reliance, 
based on the purported prior state of the law, that would be legally 
recognizable. Despite the centrality of detrimental reliance in the 
lower courts, Bush v. Gore did not purport to show that such reliance 
had been present in Florida; Bush v. Gore did not address the rele-
vance of detrimental reliance at all. 
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C.   Structural Considerations and Relative Institutional Distrust 
 I have speculated that, as a descriptive matter, lower federal 
courts might implicitly be most aggressive in scrutinizing claims of 
“new law” in cases in which the federal courts have most reason to be 
wary of the structural position of state courts vis-á-vis the election at 
issue (compared to the position of the federal courts). This distrust 
might be greatest when the election involves the state supreme court 
itself, as in Roe; or perhaps for other high state offices as well; or 
perhaps most expansively, for any state or local office. Normatively, 
such a view would be consistent with much of the theoretical under-
pinnings for the constitutional role of federal courts in overseeing 
democratic processes more generally. If there are convincing func-
tional reasons that federal courts systematically are more likely than 
state courts on certain types of elections to bring the desired detach-
ment to bear, such reasons could support more active application of 
the “new law” doctrine. Structural considerations of this sort were 
transparently at work in the two “new law” cases from outside the 
election context upon which the concurrence in Bush v. Gore relied;95 
both arose out of the early civil rights movement in which the state 
supreme courts involved, from Alabama and South Carolina, had 
proven to be systematically hostile, like their state legislatures of the 
era, over a series of cases to civil rights claims. 
 If structural analysis of this sort ought to play a role in “new law” 
cases, the crucial consideration must be whether state courts can be 
deemed systematically compromised or disadvantaged with respect to 
the relevant election law issues. The point of taking this considera-
tion into account—like taking vote dilution or detrimental reliance 
into account—is to find some place to stand, outside the context of 
the specific case at issue, from which a principled and consistent fed-
eral court judgment of new law can justifiably be made. If federal 
courts can conclude on an ad hoc basis that a particular state court 
should be distrusted on the particular issue at hand, the point of in-
voking structural considerations would largely be defeated. Federal 
courts can appropriately be objects of distrust too. If structural con-
siderations are to play a role in justifying federal oversight of state 
courts, federal courts must be able to point to a pattern broader than 
the particular case at issue to justify the implicit or explicit claim 
that they are better positioned than state courts to provide detached 
judgment. 
 Whether these considerations do or should play any role in cases 
like Roe and Griffin is unclear. But either way, structural analysis of 
                                                                                                                    
 95. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 114-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Bouie v. 
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 
(1958)).  
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this sort would not support an aggressive approach to “new law” 
claims in Bush v. Gore. Charges of partisanship swirled around vir-
tually every actor who touched upon any of the issues in this, the 
most politically explosive of all electoral issues; such charges will in-
evitably arise in contexts this incendiary—which does not make them 
wrong but does make them unavoidable. But there is no general 
structural reason to think that federal courts, or the United States 
Supreme Court, are better positioned than the state courts to have a 
comparative institutional advantage that would predictably make 
them less prone to the appearance or reality of partisan pressures or 
temptations. Bush v. Gore did not involve the Alabama Supreme 
Court deciding who had been validly elected Chief Justice to that 
court. There are no structural reasons to think that the United 
States Supreme Court would be any less “interested,” in the pejora-
tive sense, than the Florida courts in the outcome of the presidential 
election. Indeed, some have pressed all the way to the opposite con-
clusion: they have argued that the United States Supreme Court 
necessarily has a greater potential conflict of interest in the outcome, 
because the President of the United States will not be appointing 
Justices to the Florida Supreme Court.96 But one need not view the 
United States Supreme Court as more “interested” in the outcome to 
recognize that no structural reasons militate in favor of designing 
doctrine on the assumption the Court would be less interested. The 
structural considerations that might justify greater skepticism of 
state courts for certain state elections are not present when the 
Presidency of the United States is at stake. To the extent that such 
considerations do or should play a role in federal court application of 
the “new law” doctrine, Bush v. Gore cannot persuasively invoke such 
considerations. Here too, Bush v. Gore did not purport to do so, 
though the lower courts have also not expressly relied upon such fac-
tors either. But if the Roe-Griffin line is best justified in part because 
such factors were present there, those factors were not present in 
Bush v. Gore. 
                                                                                                                    
 96. Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, 
available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/3/ackerman-b.html. Judge Posner, though a 
defender of the decision, states that the interest of Supreme Court Justices in who their 
colleagues will be, and hence who the President will be, “will forever cast a shadow over 
Bush v. Gore.” Electronic Dialogue from Judge Richard A. Posner to Professor Alan M. 
Dershowitz, supra note 9. Judge Posner argues that this would have been true had the de-
cision come out the other way. But it is precisely the inevitability of such potential conflicts 
that underlie arguments that the Supreme Court should have stayed out of the dispute 
and left Congress to resolve the contest. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637 (2001). 
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D.   “New Law” and Article II of the Constitution 
 I have written about “new law” as a general legal concept (in the 
election context). Doctrinally, those lower courts that have developed 
and applied the concept have done so through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, under either the Equal Protection or Due Process 
Clauses. As we have seen, concerns about the possible creation of 
“new law” were pervasive in the United States Supreme Court’s 
questions, in its formal opinions in the election litigation, and in 
much of the academic defense of Bush v. Gore. These concerns are re-
flected in certain aspects of the Court’s equal protection holding; 
other aspects of that holding do not depend on any judgment that the 
Florida courts had changed state law. To the extent that judgments 
about “new law” play a role in Bush v. Gore through the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the analysis here applies directly. I have been com-
paring how “new law” is treated as a matter of equal protection law 
in the federal courts most willing to overturn state election decisions 
and in the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore. 
 But in Bush v. Gore, the problem of “new law” also arose under 
another doctrinal heading. The concurrence relied on Article II, Sec-
tion 1 of the Constitution in holding that the Florida Supreme Court 
had, in effect, changed state law.97 The question, then, is whether the 
concept of “new law” should be understood and applied differently 
under Article II than under the Equal Protection Clause. In particu-
lar, should or do the Article II, Section 1 provisions justify a greater 
federal court willingness to find “new law” than do the general provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment? 
 I cannot see why that would be so. Those who draw on Article II 
rely overwhelmingly—indeed, exclusively, I think it is fair to say—on 
a literal reading of the text of Article II. That text empowers each 
state to appoint presidential electors “in such Manner as the Legisla-
ture thereof may direct.”98 If this text had been designed to give fed-
eral courts a distinct and more aggressive role in overseeing state 
court election law decisions, those purposes could justify a different 
way of identifying “new law” for Article II purposes than for Four-
teenth Amendment purposes. Or if the Article II text had a history of 
being applied to authorize greater federal court oversight of state 
election law rulings, that might also support a different approach 
under Article II than under the Fourteenth Amendment. But nothing 
extrinsic to the literal text of Article II itself has come to light thus 
far to support such a position. Indeed, nothing in the original history 
of Article II, or in the history of how those provisions have been un-
derstood over time, or in the United States Supreme Court decisions 
                                                                                                                    
 97. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 113-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
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in the 2000 election litigation, or in the academic commentary sup-
portive of the concurrence that has emerged since those decisions, 
points to substantial evidence, outside the text itself, for the view 
that Article II was knowingly and purposively designed or previously 
applied to support a more aggressive federal court stance toward 
claims of “new law” under Article II than under the Equal Protection 
Clause. The most extensive defense of Bush v. Gore on Article II 
grounds is Judge Posner’s; but Judge Posner candidly admits that no 
reason exists to assert that Article II was designed to authorize a dis-
tinct federal court role in policing state courts in the presidential 
election context: “It is true that there is no evidence that the choice of 
this word [legislature] (rather than simply of ‘state’) was deliberate, 
or that the framers of the Constitution foresaw the use of Article II to 
limit the scope of state judicial intervention in the selection of a 
state’s electors.”99 Actually, however, the case is worse than this: the 
evidence that has emerged is to the contrary. 
 The most detailed investigation into the history of Article II ap-
pears in this symposium issue, in Hayward H. Smith’s article.100 
Smith is in accord with Posner that there is no evidence from the 
Constitutional Convention or the state ratifying conventions that any 
thought was given, one way or the other, as to whether the word “leg-
islature” in Article II was designed to impose distinct and special 
constraints on state court interpretation of presidential elector 
laws.101 But there is historical practice about how this provision was 
actually understood and applied, and that evidence does not support 
the view that state legislatures were any more “independent” when 
acting under Article II than they were when acting pursuant to au-
thority delegated to them elsewhere in the Constitution.  
 Thus, the founding generation treated state constitutional provi-
sions that authorized gubernatorial vetoes to apply to state legisla-
tion under Article II just as much as to any other state law. In addi-
tion, state constitutions determined how state legislatures were em-
powered to appoint presidential electors (as well as Senators, despite 
the text of the original Article I, Section 3, which empowered “the 
Legislature thereof” from each State to choose Senators). Thus, as a 
matter of historical practice, state legislatures were not understood 
at the time to be more “independent” by virtue of Article II of the 
                                                                                                                    
 99. Electronic Dialogue between Judge Richard A. Posner and Professor Alan M. Der-
showitz, supra note 9 (Monday, July 9). In his book, Judge Posner puts the point a bit less 
directly. POSNER, supra note 10, at 156 (“The interpretation that I am suggesting is not 
compelled by case law, legislative history, or constitutional language. But neither is it 
blocked by any of these conventional interpretive guides.”). 
 100. See Hayward H. Smith, The History of the Article II Independent State Legislature 
Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731 (2001). 
 101. Id. at 741.  
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constraints and conditions on their power than they were when act-
ing pursuant to any other source of authority. Nor has the seemingly 
comparable language of Article I, Section 4 ever been interpreted to 
authorize distinct and more aggressive federal court oversight of 
state court interpretations of laws regulating other national elec-
tions, such as for the United States House of Representatives.102 
 This is not the place for a full analysis of Article II. I rely on 
Smith’s detailed work and the absence in the Bush v. Gore concur-
rence or academic commentary defending that concurrence of any 
evidence, to date at least, of original purposes or historical practices 
under Article II that would rebut Smith’s findings. More importantly, 
I am not arguing for the maximalist view that Article II does not au-
thorize any federal court oversight of state courts in the presidential 
election context. I am only arguing that it is appropriate, if federal 
courts are to do so under Article II, to look by analogy at how federal 
courts have defined “new law” for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 
Absent any specific purpose behind Article II or historical practice 
applying it that would give any concrete content to the concept of 
“new law”—or, put in institutional terms, to the boundary between 
state legislatures and state courts—we will have to provide that con-
tent through theoretical analysis of how the concept of “new law” 
ought to be understood. That requires accommodating the competing 
concerns at stake: the values associated with the modern, constitu-
tionalized right to vote and the values of decentralized control over 
election regulation. That analysis also requires defining the justifica-
tions that motivate the need for such a concept and determining how 
courts should identify when new election law has been created 
impermissibly.  
 All those considerations transcend the specific constitutional pro-
visions involved, whether that provision is the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or Article II. Thus, it seems appropriate to compare how federal 
courts have identified “new law” for Fourteenth Amendment pur-
poses and how individual Justices in Bush v. Gore identified “new 
law.” Viewed against this deeper background of federal court prac-
tice, any “new law” defense of Bush v. Gore—as in the concurrence, in 
most academic commentary that has supported the Court’s result, 
and in aspects of the per curiam—would entail a balder disagree-
ment about how to read the bare words of election-law texts than any 
federal court has previously relied upon to justify the judgment that 
a state court has “changed the rules in the middle of the game” dur-
                                                                                                                    
 102. Article I, Section 4 provides “The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof. . . .” The leading precedent on this provision is Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 
(1932). 
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ing an election dispute. I know of no instance in which a federal court 
has previously “convicted” a state court of such a change without that 
conviction resting on a far more firmly anchored baseline of past 
state law and practice than anything that was present in the 2000 
election litigation. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 Defenders of America’s extraordinarily decentralized voting sys-
tem criticize Bush v. Gore for its nationalist and centralized intrusion 
on the state regulation of elections, even when that state regulation 
takes the form of state court interpretation of state election law. This 
“federalist” critique, taken in its strongest form, argues that neither 
constitutional law nor sound principle licenses federal courts to de-
cide whether state courts are making new law in the context of re-
solving election contests. I take James Gardner to be defending a po-
sition along these lines in his contribution to this symposium.103 But 
pushed that far, the position ought to raise concerns, at the least, 
when it comes to national elections. The reaction of foreign observers 
to the 2000 election may perhaps reveal something of the peculiarity 
of this strong federalist position. Having learned how dramatically 
localized electoral processes are for national office in the United 
States, these commentators find our decentralization hard to explain 
on anything other than historical, rather than functional, grounds. 
Thus, Shlomo Avineri, an Israeli political scientist, points out that 
most democratic countries have a National Election Commission, in 
some form, that seeks to ensure uniformity of processes for national 
elections.104 Similarly, Justice Nöelle Lenoir points out that in 
France, all presidential elections are regulated and “subject to per-
manent vigilant monitoring” by a single entity, the Constitutional 
Council (Lenoir was formerly a Justice on the Council); this ap-
pointed body, designed to be independent, has exclusive power to 
regulate and resolve controversies over presidential elections in 
France.105 Of course these perspectives have no direct bearing on the 
legal allocation of power between national and state institutions in 
the United States. But they do provide a comparative vantage point 
on how unusual it would be to have no national institutional over-
sight of election contests for national office. 
 Even before Bush v. Gore, United States constitutional law did not 
embrace such an extreme position. Due in part to the age of our Con-
                                                                                                                    
 103. Gardner, supra note 1.  
 104. Shlomo Avineri, A Flawed Yet Resilient System: A View From Jerusalem, in THE 
LONGEST NIGHT, supra note 15 (manuscript at 8, on file with the Florida State University 
Law Review). 
 105. Lenoir, supra note 15, at 37. 
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stitution, we do not have the intermediate institutions, such as Na-
tional Election Commissions, that oversee democracy in many more 
recently created constitutional democracies. Instead, federal courts 
have provided a degree of that oversight since the United States Su-
preme Court in the 1960s began to recognize national constitutional 
interests associated with voting and the design of America’s democ-
ratic institutions. Constitutional law has, therefore, been a major 
source for some degree of the nationalization that one might expect 
for determining the ground rules of national democratic processes. In 
accord with these constitutional (and therefore national) interests, 
some federal courts had closely scrutinized state courts to ensure 
they were not making “new law” when resolving election disputes. 
But even the most aggressive of these federal courts had sought to 
circumscribe this scrutiny by identifying specific, narrow, and pre-
cisely defined circumstances in which such scrutiny was justified. 
This Essay has not addressed the equal protection holding of Bush v. 
Gore. But I have tried to provide perspective, from within the voting 
rights field, on previous resolutions of disputes over whether state 
courts had created “new law” in election contexts. To the extent that 
aspects of Bush v. Gore—the decision or the debate about the deci-
sion—rest on the judgment that Florida’s courts had created “new 
law,” the prior law of voting rights suggests just how exceptional any 
such judgment would be. 
